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The purpose of this paper is to present the conventions, best practices, and processes that 
were established based on the prototype development of a Functional Fault Model (FFM) for 
a Cryogenic System that would be used for real-time Fault Isolation in a Fault Detection, 
Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) system. The FDIR system is envisioned to perform health 
management functions for both a launch vehicle and the ground systems that support the 
vehicle during checkout and launch countdown by using a suite of complimentary software 
tools that alert operators to anomalies and failures in real-time. The FFMs were created 
offline but would eventually be used by a real-time reasoner to isolate faults in a Cryogenic 
System. Through their development and review, a set of modeling conventions and best 
practices were established. The prototype FFM development also provided a pathfinder for 
future FFM development processes. This paper documents the rationale and considerations 
for robust FFMs that can easily be transitione<J to a real-time operating environment. 
I. Introduction 
THE Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) project funded by NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) is purposed to mature fault detection, fault isolation, anomaly detection, and 
'prognostics technologies for use in the new Constellation Program and future extra-planetary missions l , FDIR is 
intended and designed to be integrated with Ground Operations to automate fault detection and isolation during 
maintenance and checkout as well as launch countdown activities of ground and launch vehicle systems. The FDIR 
architecture supports the integration of several Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) capabilities, but this 
paper will focus on the models developed to perform the fault isolation aspect. 
Fault isolation is the capability to detect failure conditions in a system and isolate the failure2 to its root cause, 
Fault detection methods are wide-ranging and include strategies from simple limit checking of measurements to data 
mining and statistical analysis to intelligent devices and built-in tests that identify failures at the source, Once a 
fault or off-nominal behavior is detected, fault isolation techniques are employed to locate the failure mode or 
'modes of the system and implicate bad or suspected components for further testing and replacement. The FDIR 
project has chosen to employ Functional Fault Models (FFMs) as a means of performing fault isolation, An FFM 
establishes a relationship between the failure modes of various components in a system with observables or tests that 
detect those failure modes. 
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In real-time, a reasoner will evaluate the Dependency Matrix3, or D-Matrix, that enumerates those relationships 
to determine which failure modes are likely to be bad or suspect (see Figure 1 for a D-Matrix example). The FDIR 
·project has selected Qualtech Systems, Incorporated ' s (QSI's) product TEAMS (or Testability Engineering And 
Maintenance System) as the tool for creating FFMs with a graphical user interface and evaluating the D-Matrix 
derived from the FFM in real-time. The selection was based on product maturity and certifiability at the time of 
selection as well as interoperability with other FFMs that were being developed that interface with the Cryogenic 
System prototype. 
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Figure 1. Functional Fault Model and Equivalent Dependency Matrix. 
The training on the TEAMS tools from QSI and review of other FFMs that had been matured gave ample 
evidence of the need for modeling conventions. The FFM structure consists of five main components: 
1) Modules: representations of failure modes or their hierarchical containers. 
2) Arcs: the links connecting modules to one another. 
3) Test points: a special type of module that acts as a sink in the model. A test point is the place where the 
effects of a failure mode can be detected or observed. 
4) Switches: devices used to interrupt or redirect an arc. 
5) AND nodes: devices that perform a logical AND operation on the arcs. AND nodes are useful for 
modeling redundancy in a system. 
These five components, illustrated in Figure 2, are used to represent the physical structure of the system, and the 
TEAMS features functions and tests are used to model the propagation of failures throughout the system. Functions 
originate at a failure mode, and may be used to represent the effect of a failure in the immediate vicinity or an end 
effect on the system. Tests reside at the test points, and they represent the calculations that will be performed to 
determine whether a failure's effect has reached a particular point in the system. The path a function traverses from 
its originating module, over arcs, through other modules and switches, and ultimately to a test point is called a 
.Failure Effect Propagation Path, or FEPP. 
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Figure 2. Functional Fault Model Structural Components. 
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The generic quality of the FFM structural components, functions and tests make the FFM-building environment 
flexible but introduces several interpretations of how modeling should be carried out. The FDIR project intended 
for several modelers to complete the task of creating the FFM of the Cryogenic System, and other projects creating 
the FFMs that would interface with the Cryogenic System employed a different set of modelers. Therefore, it was 
imperative to create a set of modeling conventions by which all modelers would abide in order to ensure a seamless 
integration of the models. 
Developing model conventions consisted of a process of documenting which features of FFMs were being used 
by the different modeling groups, requesting QSI's advice on guidelines and best practices, internally reviewing the 
'model conventions and best practices, and organizing meetings that involved all modeling groups to compare and 
contrast internal modeling practices and agree upon a global set of conventions. In instances where conventions do 
not allow sufficient flexibility to model all types of failures and their FEPPs, a less restrictive modeling best practice 
would be suggested. Modeling conventions are generally required where model integration may be affected and 
modeling practices are relevant for modeling tasks that may be accomplished in several ways without affecting how 
the FFM will be integrated with another. 
II. Modeling Conventions 
The modeling conventions agreed upon for FFM of a Cryogenic System are presented in this section and are 
'divided into categories based on whether the convention is generic or specific to the TEAMS tool. 
A. General Functional Fault Modeling Conventions 
The general FFM conventions should be applied to all FFM developments, regardless of whether the model was 
created using the TEAMS graphical user interface or some other tool. 
1) All FFMs shall use common delimiters between fields and texts in a field to facilitate batch editing and 
software tools. 
,2) FFMs that are required to integrate with other FFMs shall agree on unique names for the operational 
configuration and mission phases of the system. 
3) The FFM shall nest modules using the hierarchy labels defined by MIL-HDBK-505 Handbook for 
Definitions of Item Levels, Item Exchangeability, Models and Related Terms4. The following hierarchy 
labels and field formats shall be used by the Cryogenic System FFM. 
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a. Failure mode: The manner by which a failure is observed and describes the way it occurs. A failure 
mode shall be formatted as follows: <Text-description>_[<FMEA-ID>], where the FMEA-ID field is 
optional. 
b. Part: One piece or two or more pieces joined together which are not normally subject to disassembly 
without destruction of designed use4. Examples of parts include orifices, limit switches, resistive 
thermal devices, thermocouples, resistors, capacitors, strain gauges, and accelerometers. A module 
with a "part" hierarchy label shall be formatted as follows: <Text-description> _<Part-number>. 
c. Assembly: A number of parts joined together to perform a specific function or unit replaceable as a 
whole that are capable of disassembly into one or more replaceable parts4. Examples of assemblies 
include fan assemblies, pressure relief and check valves, transducer and signal conditioners, quick 
disconnects, filters, tanks and dewars, circuit cards, and vaporizers. The name of an assembly module 
shall be formatted as follows: <Text-description> _<part-number>. 
d. Unit: An assembly or any combination of parts, and/or assemblies mounted together normally capable 
of independent operation in a variety of situations4. For example, pneumatically actuated cryogenic 
valves, motors, engines, pumps, power supplies, electro-pneumatic controllers, and auxiliary power 
units are considered "units." The name of a unit module shall be formatted as follows: <Text-
description> _<part-number>. 
e. Group: A collection of units, assemblies, or parts connected together or used in association to perform 
an operational function4. Examples of groups include Ground Hydraulic Power Units and Hydraulic 
Control Units. The name of a group module shall be formatted as follows: <Text-description> _ <part-
number>. 
f. Subsystem: A combination of groups, etc., that performs an operational function within a system and is 
a major subdivision of the system4. Subsystem examples include Liquid Hydrogen (LH2), Liquid 
Oxygen (LOX), Ground Power, and Pneumatics. Modules with the "subsystem" hierarchy label shall 
be formatted with a unique system identifier (see next definition), followed by the subsystem acronym 
or description, according to the format: <system-identifier> _<subsystem-acronym>. For example, the 
Ground Liquid Hydrogen subsystem would bear the name GS_LH2 which stands for "Ground System 
Liquid Hydrogen". 
g. System: A system is a combination of subsystems that can be considered as a self-sufficient unit in its 
intended operational environment4. For example, a system could be the Ground System or Vehicle 
System. "System" module labels shall contain a text description of the system in the following format: 
<Text-description>. 
4) Tests in FFMs shall conform to the following four categories to facilitate their use in the Fault Isolation 
application code development. 
a. Consistency: Parts with two states, such as valves and relays, shall have two tests per indicator to 
verify all possible conditions. The consistency test type performs logical operations that determine 
whether a dual-state part is good or has some failure condition. The real-time test logic will compare 
the commanded state of the part to its indicators. FFM consistency test names shall reflect the part 
name, indicator type (open or closed/on or oft), the indicator's measurement identifier, and a text 
description of the failed consistency check in the following format: <part-name> _ <indicator-
type> _<measurement-identifier> _<text-description>. 
b. Discrete: A discrete part shall have two tests to verify all possible conditions. The discrete test type 
verifies the state of a discrete part is properly reflected by its indicator during a particular system 
mode. FFM discrete test names shall reflect the part name, indicator type (hi or l%n or off/wet or 
dry/etc.), the indicator's measurement identifier, and a text description of the failed discrete test in the 
format: <part-name> _<indicator-type> _<measurement-identifier> _<text-description>. 
c. Analog: Depending on the nature of the part and data acquisition system, an analog instrumentation 
part shall have either three or five tests to verify whether the value is out of range. If the 
instrumentation's operating range is smaller than the actual range of the transducer, there will be five 
analog tests for the instrumentation: off-scale low, off-scale high, off-nominal low, off-nominal high, 
and loss of data. An off-scale test evaluates measurements outside the operating range of the 
instrumentation but within the range of the transducer. An off-nominal test looks for values within the 
operating range of the instrumentation that exceeds an engineering limit for the system during a 
particular system mode. A loss of data test looks for a communication problem between the transducer 
signal and the location where the measurement is used. If an instrumentation part's operating range is 
the same as the range of the transducer, there shall be three analog tests: off-nominal low, off-nominal 
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high, and loss of data. FFM analog test names shall include a text description of ~h~ measurement and 
measurement type, the indicator's measurement identifier, and a text description of the test in the 
format: <measurement-description> _<measurement-type> _<measurement-identifier> _ <test-
description>. 
d. Custom: Custom test types do not fit into the consistency, discrete or analog test type. These tests are 
more complex and involve sensor fusion or complex mathematical operations such as filtering and 
frequency analysis. FFM custom test names shall include a text description of the measurement, 
measurement type, the indicator's measurement identifier, and a text description of the test in the 
format: <measurement-description> _<measurement-type> _[ <measurement-identifier> L <test-
description>. 
B. TEAMS-specific Functional Fault Modeling Conventions 
The remaining modeling conventions specifically apply to the TEAMS FFM implementation that was selected. 
The purpose of these modeling conventions is to optimize some aspect of the TEAMS FFM for model validation, 
·sustainability, or real-time performance. 
1) Parts with discrete states shall be modeled using switches in TEAMS. The switches shall represent the 
parts in their normal state. For example, a normally closed valve would be represented with a switch 
whose failure effect propagation path is normally broken. 
2) The system mode feature in TEAMS shall be used to represent different ground and vehicle configurations 
and phases of vehicle processing. 
3) The scope of function propagation along failure effect propagation paths shall be managed with naming 
conventions. 
a. Generic: Functions that propagate between subsystems shall use the generic naming convention. The 
application of a generic function name is demonstrated in the case of a loss of ground power. Multiple 
units, assemblies, and parts in the ground and vehicle systems may be supplied by the ground power. 
A generic function for the loss of ground power can be detected by tests in many subsystems without 
the need to know which specific part in the ground power system caused the failure. Every part, 
assembly, unit, etc. in the ground power subsystem that may result in a loss of ground power should 
bear the generic function. The generic function name shall start with the prefix "GEN" followed by 
the subsystem where the failure originated, and a description of the failure, as in <GEN> _ <subsystem-
name> _<text-description>. 
b. Specific: Functions relevant to a specific subsystem that do not cross subsystem boundaries shall use 
the specific naming convention. The specific functions will only be detected by tests local to their 
subsystem. The specific function name shall have a prefix that indicates its subsystem followed by a 
text description of the failure mode as identified in the FMEA documentation. The format for specific 
functions shall be: <subsystem-name> _<text-description>. 
4) Hardware parts, assemblies or units that provide analog or discrete data feedback and/or measurements 
derived from physical hardware that provides failure effect insight shall have a test point at or near the 
modeled item. Test point labels in TEAMS shall begin with the schematic identifier, followed by the sensor 
type and then "TP" in the following format: <schematic-id> _<sensor-type> _ <TP>. 
III. Modeling Best Practices 
Functional fault modeling of the Cryogenic System also revealed some modeling options that did not necessarily 
need to be imposed as conventions; rather they were added as modeling best practices to maintain a consistent look 
and feel between FFMs. The following sections give the recommended modeling best practices for different 
situations. 
A. Bidirectional Flow 
In some systems, particularly fluid systems, it is necessary to model bidirectional flow of a commodity. QSI 
presented the modelers with two viable alternatives for representing bidirectional flow - switches and functions . 
. The switch method for representing bidirectional flow involves adding TEAMS switch components around each 
module in the FFM that allows flow to occur in both directions. The switches each have two states - one for flow in 
the left-to-right direction, and one for flow in the right-to-Ieft direction. A system mode will dictate which direction 
is currently active for all switches. The switch solution is the preferred solution because it most closely follows the 
other modeling conventions and best practices related to switch and system mode use without interfering with 
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function naming conventions. The switch solution also has the advantage of being easier to visualize, which makes 
model validation and sustainability less costly. The biggest disadvantage to the switch solution is the addition of 
more switches to the model, which results in a larger model memory footprint and real-time performance 
degradation during system mode changes. An example of a FFM using switches to implement bidirectional flow is 
shown in Fig 3. 
TP1 
Tank ~ TP2 TP3 TP4 
Pump 
Valve 
Pipe2 
«-':'-_ 1 • 1 k----4~ 
Figure 3. FFM Bidirectional Flow with Switches. 
The other bidirectional flow mechanism presented by QSI is the use of functions. In this implementation, a test 
point is placed in the model for each direction of flow. The test points each have multiple tests representing the 
progression of the function propagation from the first part to the part just before the test point. For example, at one 
test point, the first test only detects the function that originates at the first part. The second test only detects the 
functions originating from the first two parts, etc. In the second test point, the first test only detects the function that 
originates at the last part. The second test only detects the functions originating at the last part and the second to last 
part, etc. In real time, only the tests at the test point corresponding to the current flow direction would be evaluated. 
An example of an FFM with bidirectional flow implemented in functions is presented in Figure 4. Although 
.modeling bidirectional flow with functions is functionally equivalent to the use of switches, it masks the details of 
the implementation in the real-time software and makes model validation more difficult. 
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Figure 4. FFM Bidirectional Flow with Functions. 
B. Controlling Failure Effect Propagation Paths 
Where possible, switches should be used to control Failure Effect Propagation Paths (FEPPs). By convention, 
switches are used for modeling discrete-state parts and for representing system configurations and mission phases, 
but switches are also useful for controlling FEPPs where there are feedback loops and other propagation paths that 
may inadvertently allow functions to propagate to undesirable locations. For example, feedback loops or 
'bidirectional paths may allow a function to propagate through a valve assembly, even though the valve is closed and 
its associated switch state is meant to prevent any functions from propagating through it. In this event, a switch may 
be used at the entry to the valve assembly on the feedback loop or bidirectional flow arc to keep stray functions out 
of the valve assembly when it is closed. The switch will have the same discrete states as the switch that is meant to 
model the open and closed operation of the valve. 
C. Color Conventions 
Colors for hierarchy levels and arcs (links) between modules should follow color code standards where relevant. 
In the Cryogenic System, the line color of arcs follows the KSC Safety Standard for Ground Piping Systems Color 
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Code and Identifications. Following a KSC safety standard for piping systems eliminates confusion and allows the 
modelers and system experts to efficiently follow the flow propagating to and from modules . 
. D. Failure Rates and Probabilities 
Most functional fault modeling tools make concessions for including failure rate data in the FFM so that 
suspected failures may be ranked according to the probability of occurrence. However, this failure rate data is not 
always readily available. In the absence of complete or reliable failure rate data, parts may instead be grouped into 
probability classes that collect like parts with similar failure probabilities. For the Cryogenic System FFM, five 
failure probability classes were chosen. 
1) High Probability, such as transducers 
2) Medium-High Probability, such as rotating components and leaks 
3) Medium Probability, such as valves and dynamic components 
4) Medium-Low Probability, such as the data acquisition system 
5) Low Probability, such as structural components 
E. Modeling Passive Parts 
Manual valves, gauges and test ports shall not be modeled unless specified by the responsible design and/or 
system engineer. Modeling manual valves, gauges, and test ports does not aid automated fault isolation unless 
downstream instrumentation exists that can isolate the fault. However, the design engineers or system experts may 
request to add certain components to the model that may provide benefits regarding operations, troubleshooting, or 
fault isolation. 
F. Model Parts Library 
A TEAMS library of generic parts should be created and used to populate the parts of a subsystem. The generic 
parts Iibrar.y standardizes the look and feel of common parts in different subsystems and saves modelers' time from 
developing parts from scratch. A generics parts library also gives new model developers a starting point for 
understanding how parts can be represented in an FFM and familiarizes them with common parts and their failure 
modes. 
IV. Functional Fault Model Development Process 
In addition to acting as a pathfinder for modeling conventions and best practices, the FFM for the Cryogenic 
System illuminated the required steps in the model development process. This process will be refined and used as a 
guide for future FFM development. Figure 5 is a graphical depiction of this model development process as was 
developed during the Cryogenic System FFM development. 
V. Conclusion 
In summary, a prototype functional fault model of a Cryogenic System was developed using COTS TEAMS 
software. The FFM building effort exposed several model variations and issues that were resolved by agreements 
among modeling groups at NASA to abide by model conventions and best practices. In addition to fueling the 
'development of conventions and best practices, the prototype Cryogenic System FFM helped identify the major 
steps in the FFM development process. 
One of the most important lessons learned from the model conventions development process was the need for an 
overseer who could resolve differences between modeling teams and make the ultimate decision about model 
conventions when there is an impasse. Although most model conventions were quickly adopted, there were a few 
that required one group of modelers or another to have to retroactively change their models. The number of models 
affected often drove the decision for which modeling convention would be adopted, but a better solution would be to 
resolve the conflicts based on the usability, performance, and sustainability of the models. Another lesson learned 
during the model conventions development was the need to consult existing standards for modeling. During the 
·course of the reviewing and agreeing upon model conventions, the model groups discovered military and NASA 
standards that applied to FFM development and aided in resolving modeling conflicts between the groups. 
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• Control Failure Effect Propagation Paths with switches 
• Apply relevant color code standards 
- Standard for Ground Piping Systems Color Code and 
Identification 
• Where failure rates are not readily available, group failure 
modes into failure rate categories 
- High Probability: transducers 
- Medium-High Probability: rotating components and leaks 
- Medium Probability: valves and dynamic components 
- Medium-Low Probability: data acquisition system 
- Low Probability: structural components 
• Disregard passive parts 
• Develop a model parts library 
Lessons Learned 
• Establish agreements among modeling groups to abide by model 
conventions and best practices EARLY 
• Identify an overseer to resolve differences between modeling 
teams 
Models with more maturity may force other models to abide by 
modeling conventions that aren't ideal 
The mediator should consider usability, performance, and 
sustainability of the models 
• Consult existing standards for modeling 
- Review military and NASA standards that apply to FFM development 
- Independent source to resolve conflicts between modeling groups 
• Result: a prototype functional fault model of a Cryogenic System 
was developed using COTS TEAMS software 
- The prototype will be integrated with other Ground System and 
Vehicle System models to yield an Integrated FDIR capability 
